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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents and analyzes FlowerPot, an anonymous client for the BitTorrent
file-sharing system. FlowerPot is peer-to-peer, providing scalability and making it difficult
to attack with techniques like denial-of-service. It provides anonymity to users by routing
traffic through several peers before actually downloading a desired file. Each user can thus
plausibly claim to have been an intermediate hop on a routing path, not the actual
downloader. FlowerPot is easy to use, secure against a number of attacks, and has fast
enough performance to make it practical.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis presents and analyzes the design of FlowerPot, a peer-to-peer anonymous file-
sharing system capable of downloading files provided by BitTorrent [3]. BitTorrent allows
its users to efficiently download many different kinds of files with a peer-to-peer protocol
that is highly scalable. A client that can download the files provided by BitTorrent while
obscuring the IP address of the downloaders and uploaders would be valuable for free
speech, because anonymous speech is more difficult to restrict than identified speech.
The last several years have seen a proliferation of peer-to-peer file-sharing systems
[3, 10, 7, 13]. While these systems allow users to easily access many different kinds of
files, people who download some controversial content may be subjected to legal attacks.
Repressive governments, for example, may wish to restrict the transfer of material relating
to their human rights abuses or to dissident activity. A file-sharing system that is easy to use
and protects the anonymity of users would improve free speech under such governments.
Even in a free society, some topics have a social stigma associated with them, and software
providing anonymity to people accessing related materials would be useful.
While a number of anonymous file-sharing systems exist already [4, 2, 11, 12], more
work remains to be done. These systems all have a performance reduction associated with
achieving anonymity, usually because they need to route through multiple proxies and do
cryptography at each step to obscure identities, or because important nodes on their net-
works are heavily loaded. A peer-to-peer system that did not need to use cryptography
at every step would be more efficient, more scalable, and harder to attack by denial-of-
service. None of these prior systems has the diversity of files that BitTorrent provides, so
a system that had access to all of those files would also allow users to anonymously access
more information than previously possible. The purpose of FlowerPot is to improve upon
previous systems in these areas.
FlowerPot uses a routing scheme similar to Crowds to achieve anonymity [11]. Before
actually downloading a file, each client contacts one or more proxies and has the proxies do
the downloads. Rather than communicating directly with the proxies, however, the client
sends a description of what it wants to download through a random number of intermediate
hops. None of those intermediate hops can tell if their own previous hop was the initiator
of the traffic or merely another intermediate relay. Every user can thus plausibly claim to
have been an intermediate hop for every download in which he or she participated.
The proxies act like BitTorrent clients, downloading the file like any BitTorrent client
would. Instead of storing the file, however, proxies send the file to the downloader over
the same routing path in reverse. When the proxies are asked to upload part of the file (as
BitTorrent clients often are), they request the piece from the downloader.
This approach negates the need for cryptography, because we only care if the user can
be matched to the downloads he or she performed, not whether an adversary can figure out
the mix of files that are being downloaded. This helps make FlowerPot efficient.
Chapter 2 of this thesis describes work related to FlowerPot, particularly peer-to-peer
file-sharing programs and systems for anonymous communication. Chapter 3 develops the
goals for FlowerPot's design. Chapter 4 gives an overview of the design of FlowerPot.
The protocol used by FlowerPot is specified in Chapter 5. The data structures used to
implement that protocol are outlined in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 addresses some remaining
implementation details. Chapter 8 analyzes the security of FlowerPot. Chapter 9 presents
experimental data concerning FlowerPot's performance.

Chapter 2
Prior work and background
The prior work on which FlowerPot is based falls mainly into two categories: peer-to-peer
file-sharing applications and anonymizing networks. The former help users download files
from one another, while the latter help users communicate without other parties know who
is communicating with whom.
2.1 Peer-to-peer file-sharing systems
The last several years have seen the rise of several peer-to-peer file-sharing systems [3, 13,
7]. Unlike systems where end users download the file they want from a server, peer-to-peer
systems are decentralized. Instead of one single machine responsible for providing all the
content to everyone, peers trade content with one another. This requires some means of
discovering the locations of the files one is interested in downloading.
Gnutella and KaZaa are two well-known peer-to-peer file-sharing programs[13] [7].
They provide innovative approaches to propagating requests for files through the network
so that each user can find someone who has the files he or she wants. The overhead from
searching for content is significant. The most popular file-sharing system, however, avoids
the problem of propagating requests for specific files by requiring users to obtain that in-
formation out-of-band. That system is BitTorrent [3].
Because FlowerPot is based directly on BitTorrent, this thesis will now describe the
operation of BitTorrent. Say a user, Bob, wants to download a file, content.txt. First,
Bob needs to find another file with extension .torrent (usually called something like con-
tent.txt.torrent). This file is called a torrent and contains the information Bob needs to
locate other users who have the file content.txt. Ordinarily, Bob finds the torrent by down-
loading it from a web server.
The torrent does not contain the actual IP addresses of people who have the file, because
those people may enter or leave the network at any time. Instead, it contains the IP address
of another computer, called a tracker, whose job is to link up people who have or want some
file. The torrent also contains the name and size of the file (or files) being downloaded and
some other metadata.
After Bob starts up his BitTorrent client, he tells it to read the torrent he found, either
from disk or from the Internet. Bob's client then contacts the tracker and asks it for the
IP addresses of people who have at least part of the file. Bob is then able to contact those
people and download the file from them.
BitTorrent is fast because it uses upload and download capacity from all clients. The
people downloading a file also upload that file to one another. Each client advertises the
pieces it has and requests the pieces it needs from peers it knows to have them.
Some unscrupulous users might try to improve their own performance by refusing to
upload to other users. To prevent this, BitTorrent peers base their upload rate to one another
on their download rate from one another. Thus, if Bob refuses to upload quickly to Alice,
Alice will refuse to upload quickly to Bob, so Bob won't have any incentive to cheat. This
algorithm is called tit-for-tat.
BitTorrent only uploads to four peers at a time. The rest are said to be choked. Three
of the unchoked peers for a particular client are the ones who have uploaded to that client
fastest. The fourth is said to be optimistically unchoked and rotates every 30 seconds, to
look for peers that can upload faster.
After a peer has an entire file, it is called a seeder. Seeders don't have download rates
to base their unchoking on, and their sole purpose is to upload the file to others as quickly
as possible. Therefore they unchoke the three nodes to whom they have the highest upload
rates.
Because BitTorrent clients can download more quickly if they upload more quickly,
they try to obtain pieces that their peers need. When a client requests a new piece, it
chooses the one that is rarest among its peers. This policy is known as rarest first. At the
start of a download, however, the top priority is to find some piece as quickly as possible
to make oneself at all useful. Therefore clients start by requesting random pieces, and
implement rarest first once they have at least one piece.
When a client downloads a piece, it needs to make sure the piece is correct. To do this,
it computes the SHAI hash of the piece. The torrent contains the SHAl hashes of all the
pieces of the file, so the client can be confident that it has the right piece as long as the
hashes match.
BitTorrent is widely popular. Pouwelse et al., have observed hundreds of thousands of
downloads using a single tracker on a daily basis [9]. Typical peers downloading a popular
file are able to achieve many times the speed of other file-sharing systems [3]. Pouwelse et
al., found that the average peer is able to achieve hundreds of kbps.
2.2 Anonymizing overlay networks
A number of prior systems provide various kinds of anonymous communication. Typically,
these systems are implemented at the application level with an overlay network. They focus
on preventing parties external to a communication from knowing who is involved in the
communication, encrypting the content being exchanged, and sometimes even preventing
users from knowing whom they are communicating with. FlowerPot draws upon ideas
from several of these systems, most notably Crowds and MorphMix [11] [12].
Crowds is a system that provides one-way anonymity: the source of traffic knows who
the destination is, but the reverse is not true [11]. Say Bob wants to send a message to a
particular peer, Alice. Bob contacts another random node, say Charles. He tells Charles
the message he wants to send and Alice's IP address. Charles then flips a weighted coin. If
it comes up heads, he sends the message directly to Alice. If it comes up tails, he forwards
the message to another random node, say Dave, who then repeats the process. Every node
can plausibly claim to have been an intermediate node on the path, so the true source is
kept anonymous.
Onion Routing is a type of anonymous communication that is more complex and pro-
vides stronger protections [4]. It sends traffic over a path of several nodes, each of which
does cryptographic operations to partially decode the message and figure out who its next
hop is. The final hop has enough information to decode the message and read it. Though
Onion Routing provides stronger anonymity than Crowds, it comes at the cost of expensive
cryptographic operations and trusting a key-distribution infrastructure.
A peer-to-peer Onion Routing system from which FlowerPot borrows some ideas is
MorphMix [12]. MorphMix uses all peers as routers. This decentralizes the system and
spreads the load out over the whole network, but requires a way to discover peers who are
signed on. MorphMix has a central server from which nodes can request the IP addresses
of peers when they sign on. Because the central server could be occasionally down due to
a denial-of-service attack, MorphMix also allows new nodes to request IP addresses from
any peer they have seen on the network before.
The server is the preferred method of getting peers, because it is guaranteed to provide
an unbiased sample of nodes who are currently on [12]. The second method helps decen-
tralize the system, reduce the load on the server, and allow the system to continue operating
during attacks [12]. FlowerPot borrows this idea of having multiple sign-on methods and
partial centralization directly from MorphMix.
2.3 New contributions of FlowerPot
FlowerPot's main new contribution is to combine anonymous communication with efficient
peer-to-peer file-sharing. Further, it does not require any public keys and gives users access
to anything that can be downloaded via BitTorrent.
By avoiding public keys, FlowerPot is simple and efficient. As shown in Chapter 9, its
speed is competitive with BitTorrent. It does not need to spend resources acquiring keys
or doing expensive cryptographic operations and does not have a key server that can be
attacked by denial of service. Systems that require a key server also require users to trust
the administrator of that server not to collude to compromise anonymity. FlowerPot does
not require that trust.
Relatedly, FlowerPot focuses on what is really important to its application: protecting
the identity of the downloaders and uploaders. FlowerPot proxies are not anonymous and
don't need to be because their users have no knowledge of what files they're being used to
download. FlowerPot content is also not encrypted. FlowerPot can thus use a simple, fast
routing algorithm to set up paths to proxies.

Chapter 3
FlowerPot design
FlowerPot was designed with several goals in mind. Chief among them were anonymity,
performance, usability, and robustness against the problems encountered by real networks.
3.1 Anonymity guarantees
The form of anonymity FlowerPot provides is plausible deniability. That is, it allows each
user to plausibly claim that he or she was not responsible for any particular download or
upload. Plausible deniability is enough for anonymous file-sharing applications because
many jurisdictions won't sanction a user for actions he or she was not responsible for.
FlowerPot provides plausible deniability by routing all traffic to and from a BitTorrent
swarm through a path of several peers. At the end of the path is a proxy that interacts with
the BitTorrent swarm on behalf of the FlowerPot downloader. The length of the path is
random, and no one on the path knows if his previous hop initiated the download. Thus
every user can plausibly claim to have merely been an intermediary.
FlowerPot establishes paths to proxies as Crowds does [ 11]. The downloader chooses
two peers to be the proxy and the first hop on the path. It sends the first hop a message
indicating that it wants to set up a path to the chosen proxy. The first hop sends the message
to another peer or to the proxy, each with some probability. After a path is established, the
proxy downloads the file as a regular BitTorrent client. Instead of storing the file, however,
it sends the pieces backwards over the same path to the downloader. When a BitTorrent
peer requests a piece, the FlowerPot proxy sends a request for it over the anonymous path,
waits for a reply from the downloader, and sends back the result.
FlowerPot does not provide anonymity to proxies or intermediate hops. The owners of
those machines are still protected, however: no proxy downloads more than 10% of the
pieces in the file and no proxy or intermediate node keeps any of the file in stable storage.
The owners of those machines can therefore avoid responsibility by pointing out that they
did not know what their machines were being used for, that they did not end up with a copy
of the file, and that they did not possess most of the file at any time.
FlowerPot does not provide anonymity to trackers or machines serving torrents. Bit-
Torrent already has the ability to distribute the information in trackers over many peers in
a distributed hash table without those peers' knowledge, and implementing this technology
anonymously in a future version of FlowerPot would be useful.
Some systems try to hide the content being transferred, not just the identities of the
persons responsible. FlowerPot does not try to do that, and indeed it would be impractical
because an adversary could easily just download a file to find out what its content is. Ob-
scuring the content is unimportant for file-sharing applications, however; users really only
care that they cannot be matched with what they are downloading.
3.2 Performance
Users will not use a file-sharing program if it is very slow. FlowerPot tries to gain perfor-
mance by using multiple proxies to download faster than it would otherwise. It also avoids
avoids doing large cryptographic computations and does not use heavily-loaded central
components. This is sufficient to perform nearly as well as BitTorrent. Detailed perfor-
mance measurements are found in Chapter 9.
3.3 Usability
FlowerPot can attract more users if its user interface is clear. It has two user interfaces, both
similar to BitTorrent. One is a command-line interface that takes the URL of the torrent as
an argument. The other is a graphical user interface with a simple window for signing on
and a window to display downloads that is similar to the BitTorrent 4.2.2 interface.
3.4 Robustness
Real networks face many challenges. FlowerPot is designed to cope with them. Nodes are
constantly failing or entering and leaving the network, so FlowerPot needs to be able to
tolerate the loss of any peer at any time. Greedy users could try to take resources without
contributing any, hurting performance. An adversary could sign up many nodes running
modified source code to try to hurt performance, compromise anonymity, or make people
download incorrect files.
3.4.1 Churn and failures
Nodes on a peer-to-peer network are constantly entering and leaving the system, or failing.
This leads to two problems for FlowerPot: a path to a proxy may break at any time, or by
the time FlowerPot tries to establish a path through some peer that peer may be gone.
FlowerPot deals with path failures by sending keepalive messages on all paths it has
established. If a path does not carry a message for some period of time, FlowerPot assumes
the path to be broken. It deallocates the state associated with such a path and sets up a new
path. Because each download uses multiple proxies, even when this occurs FlowerPot can
continue to make progress.
To reduce the chances of trying to establish a path through a peer that has left the
network, each FlowerPot client sends keepalive messages to all peers it knows about. Peers
that have not been heard from for too long are assumed to be gone and removed from the
list of peers. From time to time, FlowerPot requests new peers from a particular server and
from some peers that are still up.
3.4.2 Greedy users
Some users in a peer-to-peer network might try to take resources from the network without
providing any. This could harm the performance of the system. FlowerPot attempts to
detect them and stop giving them any help.
When FlowerPot does work on behalf of some peer, it tracks the difference between
how much work it has done for its peer and how much the peer has done for it. If this
difference becomes too great, FlowerPot stops doing work on behalf of the peer. This is
similar to the scheme of eliminating free-riding in BitTorrent proposed by Jun and Ahamad
[6]. Peers that cheat severely also get added to a client's blacklist that is stored across
sessions, so that it will refuse to perform work on their behalf in the future.
Hales and Patarin have observed that cheating BitTorrent is possible, but that few users
actually do it [5]. They theorize that the reason there are so few cheaters is that BitTorrent
swarms are isolated to a single file. All the peers of a given user therefore have some com-
mon interest with that user, which they argue encourages altruism. Similarly, FlowerPot
users all share a common interest in anonymity, which may encourage a similar coopera-
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tive spirit.
3.4.3 Malicious users
FlowerPot prevents or can cope with several attacks that adversaries may try to perpetrate
against it. lThe decentralized structure provides immunity against denial-of-service attacks.
The routing algorithm ensures that all users have plausible deniability against most real
adversaries. Malicious insiders have relatively little ability to hurt performance or figure
out who is downloading what files unless the adversary is able to buy and coordinate a very
large number of colluding nodes, which is a costly and difficult attack to mount. Chapter 8
addresses security issues more fully.

Chapter 4
Flowerpot overview
This chapter is an overview of FlowerPot. FlowerPot has five components. The first com-
ponent, a discovery server, is used to get the IP addresses of peers. After obtaining these
addresses, FlowerPot can ask them to help it establish paths for anonymous routing. The
intermediate nodes on the paths are the second component. The third component is the
downloaders/uploaders of the files, which go on one end of each anonymous path. The
other end is the fourth component, a proxy. Those proxies create modified BitTorrent
clients, the fifth and final component.
4.1 Peer discovery
When a FlowerPot client starts up, it needs to do acquire the IP addresses of other Flower-
Pot clients. It does so by sending a request to a discovery server, which replies with some
IP addresses. Clients periodically request more IP addresses from a server in order to keep
their lists of peers up-to-date and inform the server that they are still on. There may be
one discovery server, or there may be several, each knowing about some fraction of the
network.
The server may be down sometimes or some peers unable to reach it. Therefore Flow-
erPot provides a second way to sign on: nodes store all IP addresses of peers they've seen
before and can request IP addresses from any peer. If a user is unable to find any peer
it has seen before, there is a third method of obtaining IP addresses: a user can enter an
IP address and have FlowerPot request peers from that address. Thus, as long as the user
knows about one FlowerPot user out-of-band, he can get on and begin using the network.
This idea of having multiple methods of obtaining peers is taken from MorphMix [12].
4.2 Path setup
Once FlowerPot has discovered the peers it needs, it can use them to set up anonymous
paths. To initiate a path, a client sends a SETUP message containing the IP address of a
proxy to a random peer. With some probability, that peer sends a SETUP message to the
destination. Otherwise, it sends one to a random other peer which behaves in the same way.
Eventually, the message reaches the destination. This is similar to how Crowds works [11].
The destination sends a SETUPACK message back to the next-to-last hop, which continues
passing it back. Eventually, the SETUPACK finds its way back to the peer that initiated the
path.
The same sockets that carry the SETUP messages will carry all future messages from
the downloader to the proxy, and the same sockets that carry the SETUPACK messages will
carry all future messages the other way. Intermediate nodes merely receive and forward the
packets. If a socket times out, they assume the path to be broken and stop listening on its
sockets.
4.3 Downloaders/uploaders and proxies
The component of FlowerPot that actually sets up the anonymous paths is a downloader/uploader.
Its purpose is to cause FlowerPot to anonymously participate in a BitTorrent swarm for a
file whose torrent is at particular URL. When a downloader/uploader starts, it initiates
anonymous paths to some proxies, then sends a message to each proxy that contains the
URL of the torrent. The proxies read the torrent and send the relevant information (file-
name, file size, piece hashes, etc.) to the downloader/uploader. The downloader/uploader
replies by telling the proxies to join the BitTorrent swarm, which they do by contacting
the tracker. Each proxy behaves like a regular BitTorrent client when interacting with the
rest of the swarm, but instead of saving pieces to disk, it sends them over the anonymous
paths back to the downloader/uploader. When a BitTorrent peer requests a piece from a
FlowerPot proxy, the FlowerPot proxy requests it over the anonymous path from the down-
loader/uploader and replies with the result.
4.4 BitTorrent clients
The final piece of FlowerPot is the group of objects needed to run a BitTorrent client.
These are very similar or identical to the ones that appear in the regular BitTorrent code.
Following is a summary of the most important classes used in BitTorrent.
SingleTorrent: Each downloader/uploader is represented by a SingleTorrent, which has
each of the other objects associated with that file within it (i.e. all the classes that follow,
plus a few others). A FlowerPot client has one SingleTorrent for each download in which
it is a proxy.
Multitorrent: This class is an object that contains the SingleTorrents of all the down-
loads currently running. Each FlowerPot client has exactly one of these.
Connection: BitTorrent and FlowerPot clients use Connection objects to represent a
connection to a single peer in a BitTorrent swarm.
Storage: This object provides the abstractions BitTorrent needs to read and write files
on disk. FlowerPot maintains a similar object, called LocalStorage, on the download-
ers/uploaders, but does not need one on the proxies (because they don't store their files
locally).
StorageWrapper: BitTorrent downloads are broken up into pieces of default size 262144
bytes. The interface of Storage objects is in terms of files and bytes, so they are placed
inside a StorageWrapper, whose interface is in terms of pieces. FlowerPot replaces this
class with two new classes. LocalStorageWrappers are used by downloaders/uploaders as
wrappers for LocalStorage objects. AnonymousStorageWrappers are used by proxies for
dealing with network requests to send or receive pieces from the downloader.
SingleDownload: BitTorrent treats the communication with a single peer that is cur-
rently uploading to it as a SingleDownload object. Each SingleDownload has a Connection
to the relevant peer, and when that Connection gets certain messages, the methods of the
SingleDownload get called to act upon it. For example, when a piece arrives, the gotpiece
method of the SingleDownload runs to store the piece and request a new piece.
Downloader: The Downloader manages the SingleDownload objects.
Upload: BitTorrent maintains an upload object for each peer to which it is currently
uploading. Like a SingleDownload, an Upload has a Connection for its peer. When the
Connection gets certain messages, it calls methods of the Upload to induce a response. For
example, when a peer requests a piece, Upload's gotrequest method runs to add that piece
to the buffer of requests that need to be answered. It does not reply by sending the piece
immediately, because actually sending the piece is the job of the RateLimiter.
RateLimiter: The RateLimiter makes sure that a BitTorrent client does not send faster
than its maximum rate. It measures how quickly it is sending data and calls methods of the
Upload objects to send more when it can.
Choker: As described in Chapter 2, BitTorrent clients only upload to a small subset of
their peers at once. The rest of the peers are said to be choked. BitTorrent (and FlowerPot)
clients use a Choker to decide which peers in a BitTorrent swarm to choke.
PiecePicker: BitTorrent clients request pieces one by one using a rarest-first algorithm,
as described in Chapter 2. FlowerPot uses the same algorithm when making requests to
peers in the BitTorrent swarm. The PiecePicker decides which piece to request next. In
FlowerPot, the PiecePicker also informs the downloader of what pieces it requests, so that
it can inform the other proxies and avoid having multiple proxies download the same piece.

Chapter 5
FlowerPot protocol specification
The behavior of FlowerPot clients is best described by stating the messages FlowerPot
clients send and how they respond to each message they receive. This chapter describes
those messages and responses. The messages can be divided into three categories: those
used for peer discovery, for setting up and maintaining paths and initiating downloads, and
for storing and retrieving files.
5.1 Peer discovery messages
SIGNONREQ: When a FlowerPot client starts up, it sends a SIGNONREQ to a peer or to
a discovery server. The format of a SIGNONREQ is "SIGNONREQ: Jnumber : I", where
number is a number of peers that the one signing on wants to request. Currently, when
signing on, FlowerPot always requests 60 peers from the discovery server or from a peer.
If a discovery server receives a message, it replies with a NODES message that contains
the IP addresses of some peers. Another peer receiving one responds the same way, but
also responds by sending a PEER.REPORT to the discovery server. The purpose of a
PEER-REPORT is to inform the discovery server that a node signed on without contacting
it. That way, if one user cannot contact the server but another can, the server can still learn
about that person's IP address.
NODEREQ: When a FlowerPot node decides it needs the IP addresses of more peers,
it sends a NODEREQ to each of several peers and to a discovery server. The response to
a NODEREQ is identical to the response to a SIGNONREQ, except that the peers do not
send PEERIREPORT messages.
PEERKEEPALIVE: FlowerPot needs to keep its list of peers up-to-date: peers that
have signed off are of little use. Therefore FlowerPot occasionally requests more peers. In
order to get rid of old peers, FlowerPot checks all of its peers periodically and forgets about
any that it hasn't heard from in 150 seconds. To avoid expiring peers that are still on the
network, FlowerPot peers send a message with contents "PEERJKEEPALIVE: I" to one
another every so often. FlowerPot also sends these keepalives to the discovery server. The
time between consecutive PEERKEEPALIVE messages to each peer or discovery server
defaults to 120 seconds, but can be adjusted to be less frequent for heavily-loaded peers by
setting an interval in a NODES message.
NODES: A NODES message is a response to a request for peer IP addresses which it
can add to its table of peers. The format of these messages is "NODES: linterval : In :
jip, - timel, ip2 - time2 ,..., ipn - timen : I". The IP addresses are ipl, ip2, .. , ipn. The
times are how long ago the sender last received a message from that peer. When a node
receives a NODES message, it adds all the IP addresses to its table of peers. interval is the
time in seconds that the peer sending the NODES message wants the receiver to start using
between PEERKEEPALIVE messages to it. It defaults to 120. If a node becomes heavily
loaded, it increases that interval to limit the total number of keepalives it receives to 25 per
second.
PEERREPORT: When a client signs on by contacting a peer rather than the discovery
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server, the discovery server still needs to know that peer exists so that its IP address can be
given out to other peers. Therefore after any node other than a discovery server responds to
a SIGNONREQ message, it also sends a PEER.REPORT to a discovery server containing
that peer's IP address. The format of a PEERREPORT is "PEER-REPORT: Iclientip : I",
where clientip is the IP address.
5.2 Path setup messages
SETUP: A SETUP message is a request to a peer to establish an anonymous path to a
particular destination. Its format is "SETUP: If id : Idestip : Ig, p, A : I". fid is a number
called a flow ID that will be used by the next node on the path to indicate which path future
messages are part of. destip is the destination's IP address. The numbers g, p, and A are
part of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange that will be used to encrypt the URL of the torrent
[8]. p is a large prime number and g is always 5. The node initiating the path remembers a
number a and chooses A such that
A = ga(mod p). These numbers will be used along with the numbers the destination sends
back to encrypt the URL of the torrent.
When an intermediate hop receives a SETUP message, it replaces the flow ID with a
new value and either sends it to the destination or to another peer. It then begins receiving
on the socket the SETUP arrived on. When the destination finally receives the message,
it sends its previous hop a SETUPACK on a new socket. It then begins receiving on the
socket the SETUP message arrived on, waiting for more traffic from the downloader. All
traffic from the downloader to the proxy will travel over the same sockets as the SETUP
messages.
SETUPACK: After receiving a SETUP message, the proxy needs to inform the down-
loader that it was received by sending it a SETUPACK. The format of a SETUPACK is
"SETUPACK: Ifid : IB : I". The machine sending the SETUPACK received its flow ID,
fid, in its SETUP message. The SETUPACK travels the path from downloader to proxy in
reverse, with fid being used by each node to figure out what path the SETUPACK is part
of. B is a number used in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The proxy chooses a number b
and computes B = gb(mod p) for the values of g and p that the SETUP message contained.
The result of this key exchange is used when a GETINFO message is processed.
When an intermediate hop receives a SETUPACK, it sends one to its previous hop and
then receives on the socket the SETUPACK arrived on. When the downloader receives a
SETUPACK. It responds by sending a GETINFO message to the proxy and beginning to
receive on the socket the SETUPACK arrived on. All future communication coming to the
downloader will use the same sockets as the SETUPACKs.
GETINFO: A GETINFO message tells the proxy to read the torrent at a particular
URL and both store and send back its contents. Its format is "GETINFO: length :
lencryptedur". encryptedur is the encrypted URL of the torrent, and length is the num-
ber of bytes contained therein. The encryption is done with a simple exclusive-or opera-
tion based on bytes obtained from a key schedule. The key chosen by the downloader is
Ba(mod p), which is equal to the key chosen by the proxy, Ba(mod p) [8]. After receiving
a GETINFO message and decrypting the torrent URL, the proxy reads the torrent, stores
the contents, and sends back a TORRENTINFO message to the downloader.
TORRENTINFO: A TORRENTINFO message is used to inform the downloader of the
contents of a torrent. Its format is "TORRENTINFO: If ile1, file2, ... , file : I
size, size2,..., size, : Im : 1piecelength : jhashes". The files strings are the names of
the files being downloaded (BitTorrent can download a whole directory of files at once).
The sizes's are the numbers of bytes in each file. m is the number of pieces to be down-
loaded, and piecelength is the length of each. hashes is a string of bytes. The first 20
bytes are the hash of the torrent itself. The rest of the message consists of m 20-byte
strings which are the hashes of each piece.
When a downloader receives a TORRENTINFO message, it checks the hashes to make
sure they agree with the hashes from any other proxies that have sent TORRENTINFO
messages, to defend against an adversary sending back incorrect hashes to prevent the file
from being downloaded properly. The actions taken if this check fails will be returned to in
Chapter 8. Assuming the check succeeds, the downloader stores the data contained in the
message and creates the state needed to store the file being downloaded if that state does not
exist. If the file has already been partially downloaded on a prior session, the downloader
also compares the pre-existing data with the hashes and determines if any correct pieces
are already present on disk. Then it sends a BEGINDL message to the proxy to start the
download and goes back to receiving on the socket to wait for more messages.
BEGINDL: A BEGINDL message tells a proxy to start downloading the file indicated
in the prior GETINFO message. Its format is "BEGINDL: Ipl, P2, ... , A, : ". The pi's are
the indices of the pieces the downloader already has, if any. When a proxy receives a BE-
GINDL, it stores the piece indices and uses a method of its AnonymousMultitorrent object
to create an AnonymousSingleTorrent, which contacts the tracker and joins the BitTorrent
swarm. The proxy then goes back to receiving more data from the downloader.
KEEPALIVE: These messages get sent along the paths in both directions. Every five
seconds, the downloader sends each of its proxies a KEEPALIVE message and vice versa.
The format of a KEEPALIVE message is, simply, "KEEPALIVE: I".
CANCEL: A CANCEL message can be sent by either a proxy or a downloader. Its pur-
pose is to stop a download. The format of a CANCEL message is generally "CANCEL: (".
Sometimes a peer decides to send back a CANCEL message instead of a SETUPACK be-
cause it is refusing to participate in setting up a path. In that case, the format is "CANCEL:
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Iflowid : I" so that the nodes along the path can figure out which path the CANCEL needs
to be sent on. Proxies respond to a CANCEL message by ceasing to do work for that
download and deallocating their associated state. Downloaders do the same, but also send
a SETUP message to replace the proxy.
NOMETAINFO: These messages are sent when the proxy has failed to read the torrent
indicated in a GETINFO message. It has the same effects as a CANCEL message. Its
format is "NOMETAINFO: I".
TOOBUSY: When a proxy or intermediate node refuses to set up a path because it is
involved in too many other downloads already, it sends a TOOBUSY message instead of a
SETUPACK. This has the same effect as a CANCEL message. The format is "TOOBUSY:
If lowid : I".
5.3 File storage/retrieval messages
PART: A PART message contains part of a piece being downloaded. When a BitTorrent
peer send part of a piece to a FlowerPot proxy, the proxy stores the result temporarily. If the
entire piece has been received, the proxy compares the hash of that piece to the hash from
the torrent. If they disagree, it sends a PIECEWRONG message to the proxy. Otherwise
it sends a PART message to the proxy. If the whole piece has not been downloaded, the
proxy sends back a PART message immediately.
The format of a PART message is "PART: lindex : Ilength: Ibegin: Ibytes". index is
the index of the piece being downloaded (0 is the first piece in the file, 1 is the second, etc.).
begin is how far into that piece the data in the message is. length is how many bytes are
being sent. For example, if index is 17, length is 1024, and begin is 2048, then the PART
message contains bytes 2048 through 3071 of piece 17 (1024 bytes beginning at 2048).
bytes is the actual data in that part of the piece.
Upon receiving a PART message, the downloader checks the hash of the data contained
therein to make sure it agrees with the hash it received in the TORRENTINFO messages.
If the piece is correct, the downloader writes it to disk and sends an OTHERGOT message
to each of the other proxies that it has received a SETUPACK from, so that they can begin
advertising that they have that piece. If the piece is wrong, something must be wrong with
the path. A well-behaved path will either send back a PIECEWRONG message or a correct
piece. Therefore the downloader sends the proxy a CANCEL message and establishes a
new path.
PIECEWRONG: When a proxy gets an incorrect piece from the BitTorrent swarm,
it sends a PIECEWRONG message to the downloader. The downloader deletes the in-
correct partial piece that has been received thus far. If a proxy sends back too many
PIECEWRONG messages, the proxy is assumed to be faulty and the path is killed. The
format of these messages is "PIECEWRONG: jindex : I".
OTHERGOT: When a PART message arrives and a piece has been successfully down-
loaded, the proxies other than the one that downloaded it need to be informed that the
downloader has it, both so that they don't waste time downloading it again and so that they
can advertise to other BitTorrent peers that they have it. They do this when they receive a
message of the form "OTHERGOT: Iindex : I".
REQUEST: Proxies cache up to 50 pieces locally, to respond to requests from BitTor-
rent peers. If a piece is not in the cache, the proxy sends a REQUEST to the downloader
to obtain the piece. The format of a REQUEST message is "REQUEST: lindex : (begin :
Ilength : Inonce : I". This indicates a request for part of the piece whose number is index,
offset from the beginning of that piece by a number of bytes equal to begin and continuing
for a number equal to length. nonce is a unique nonce that a particular proxy does not
re-use in a single download to uniquely identify all the different requests for pieces. Af-
ter sending a REQUEST, the thread in which it was sent waits for a RESPONSE message
containing the data.
RESPONSE: After receiving a REQUEST message for a particular piece, a downloader
replies with a RESPONSE message. If the downloader does not actually have that piece,
the format of the RESPONSE is "RESPONSE: INONE: Inonce : I", where nonce is the
same as the nonce contained in the REQUEST message. When this type of RESPONSE
is received, proxy reports that it does not have the piece. If the downloader does have the
piece, the RESPONSE is of the form "RESPONSE: Inonce : (length : (bytes". length is
the length of the string of bytes at the end of the message. Those bytes are the bytes of the
appropriate piece of the file beginning at the offset indicated in the REQUEST. The length
may be several times as long as the length requested, so that the proxy can cache more
of the piece and avoid having to make more requests over the network. After receiving a
RESPONSE message, the proxy sends the piece to its BitTorrent peer.
REQUESTING: When a BitTorrent client needs to ask its peers for a new piece, it
uses the rarest-first algorithm. FlowerPot does the same thing, but it tries to avoid having
multiple proxies request the same piece. This requires coordinating among the proxies.
When a proxy requests a piece, it sends a message of the form "REQUESTING: (index : I"
to the downloader. The downloader then informs the other proxies that the piece was
requested with an OTHERREQUESTING message.
OTHERREQUESTING: When a downloader receives a REQUESTING message, it
sends an OTHERREQUESTING message to the other proxies. The format of the message
is
"OTHERREQUESTING: lindex : ". Upon receiving these messages, the proxies remem-
ber the index. When they choose pieces, instead of doing a straight rarest-first selection,
they try to select the rarest piece that no other proxy has requested, to avoid duplicating
work. If a proxy has no pieces available that haven't been requested by a fellow proxy yet,
rather than wasting time by requesting nothing it requests a piece that another proxy has
already requested. This significantly improves the speed of downloads, because proxies
don't waste time waiting around before the file is finished. If one proxy is choked by the
BitTorrent peers that have a particular piece, other proxies can try to download it. The
benefit of this becomes clear at the end of a download. When this functionality was not
yet implemented, downloads would reach the point of being over 97% complete quickly
and take a very long time to finish, as sometimes happens with BitTorrent. Adding this
functionality made FlowerPot look more aggressively for the last few pieces.
DLCAP: To prevent the owner of a FlowerPot proxy from being held responsible for
downloading an entire file, no single proxy will download more than 10% of the pieces
of any file. If another piece would put a proxy over that limit, then after it sends its final
PART message it follows it with a DLCAP message. Upon receiving that message, the
downloader breaks the path and establishes a new one to some other proxy. The format of
a DLCAP message is "DLCAP: J".

Chapter 6
FlowerPot Data Structures
A key aspect of the design of FlowerPot is its data structures. There are five categories of
data structures in FlowerPot: those for maintaining lists of peers, for setting up paths, for
downloading, for acting as a proxy, and for implementing a BitTorrent client. This chapter
details some of those data structures. Others exist, but this chapter focuses on the ones that
are non-trivial and are needed to understand how FlowerPot works.
6.1 Peer discovery
FlowerPot stores a few data structures for discovering and maintaining a list of peers it
can use as proxies or intermediate nodes on anonymous paths. It needs to store the list of
currently-active peers, the cache of all peers it has seen before, and several data structures
for maintaining the blacklist of nodes it assumes are greedy and won't communicate with.
The list of currently-active peers is maintained in a hash map called IPs. It maps IP
addresses to the last times the corresponding machines were heard from. (When a peer
is first added to the map after being seen in a NODES message, the time included in the
NODES message is subtracted from the current time and the IP address is mapped to the
result.) Any time a message is received from a peer, that time is updated. FlowerPot
periodically removes all the peers it has not heard from in the last 150 seconds.
FlowerPot stores a cache of all IP addresses it has ever seen. It obtains these from a file
it periodically writes to disk, and stores them in a hash map called peercache that maps IP
addresses to the last time the corresponding machines were heard from. Peers that haven't
been seen in over a year are deleted.
Nodes that FlowerPot decides have behaved extremely greedily are added to a blacklist
and FlowerPot refuses to do any work on their behalf. It stores a hash map from IP ad-
dresses to number of "black marks" (e.g. the number of times the corresponding peer was
determined to have been bad). The map is called blacklist and it is stored in a file between
sessions.
FlowerPot uses other data to decide whether to add a peer has been greedy to the black-
list. Each FlowerPot client stores the difference between how much traffic a peer has done
on behalf of itself (e.g. how much data has traveled on paths where the peer was immedi-
ately after it) and how much work it has done for the peer (e.g. how much data has travelled
on paths where it was immediately after the peer) in a hash map called my debts, keyed by
the peer's IP address and mapping the address to a number of bytes.
6.2 Path setup state
FlowerPot has a number of data structures it needs to store to manage the anonymous paths
it sets up. Some of these are used by intermediate hops, some by proxies, and some by
downloaders.
When a FlowerPot client receives a SETUP message and is not the intended destination,
it needs to store some data so that when the SETUPACK arrives, it can determine which
path that SETUPACK was supposed to be part of. When an intermediate hop detects that
a path has failed in one direction, it needs to stop listening in the other direction. This is
done with two hash maps. One maps the client's next hop's IP address and flow ID to the
previous hop's IP address and the client's own flow ID. The other maps the same data in
the other direction.
FlowerPot stores relatively little state pertaining specifically to the paths on the proxy
side. There is a single ProxyDLs object on each FlowerPot client that represents all the
downloads in which that client is acting as a proxy. When a SETUP message arrives at its
destination, FlowerPot calls the addtorrent method of the ProxyDLs object. That method
sends the SETUPACK and calls a method named process from-anonymousdownloader,
which runs as long as the download is going. It waits for messages from the downloader,
responds appropriately, then waits to receive the next message. One of the parameters to
those methods is the socket to use to send data to the downloader.
Sometimes, a client decides that a download in which it is the proxy has failed. This re-
quires killing that proxy and deallocating its state. Each ProxyDLs object assigns a unique
integer to each download when it receives a GETINFO message. It also contains a set
called killed_ids. When one of these integers is added to the set, the proxy stops receiving
traffic and calls the AnonymousSingleTorrent's shutdown method.
On the proxy side, FlowerPot also stores the set of torrent URLs it is currently helping
to download. If a GETINFO message arrives asking it to download a file it is already
downloading, the proxy replies with a CANCEL message. This prevents the same machine
from trying to join the BitTorrent swarm more than once.
The state for handling the paths on the downloader side is stored in a data structure
called anonDLs, which is a set of AnonymousDownload objects, each representing one
download. The state pertaining to specific paths is in the AnonymousDownload objects.
The sockets used to send data to proxies are held in a number of hash maps, which are all
keyed with an ordered pair whose first element is the IP address of the next hop and whose
second element is the flow ID of the next hop. One such hash map, called unacked, stores
the sockets that have had a SETUP message sent on them but for which no SETUPACK
has been received. Another hash map, sockets, contains the ones that have had a SETUP
sent on them and had a SETUPACK received to complete establishment of that path.
Each AnonymousDownload stores a set called checks, which is a bunch of timers that
each run ten seconds after a SETUP message was sent. They make sure the SETUPACK
has arrived by that time, or, if it hasn't, they kill the proxy, cause its state to be removed
from unacked, and send a new SETUP message to a new proxy.
Because data travels from downloader to proxy on one set of sockets and from proxy
to downloader on another set, an AnonymousDownload needs a way to store the incom-
ing sockets, as well. Like the proxies, it does not store them in an explicit data structure.
Instead, the method processincoming.msgs is called when a SETUPACK arrives, with
the socket it arrived on as a parameter. This method receives a message from the proxy,
responds appropriately, then waits to receive another message. It runs as long as the down-
load is going.
Sometimes a proxy needs to be killed. Perhaps the download was stopped altogether,
or the proxy has not received a piece in a long time (two minutes), or an intermediate node
on the path has failed. When that happens, the key corresponding to that proxy (e.g. the
ordered pair of the first hop's IP address and its flow ID) is added to a set called killed keys.
When the key for some proxy is added to the set, the instance of process incoming _msgs
that is listening for messages from that proxy stops running. The AnonymousDownload
eventually replaces the proxy by sending out another SETUP message.
6.3 Download state
AnonymousDownload objects use some state to store the files they download. Each one has
a LocalStorage object named storage, which is similar to the Storage object in BitTorrent.
It provides an interface for reading and writing the files being downloaded to and from
the disk. Because most BitTorrent modules communicate in terms of pieces, not bytes
and files, FlowerPot uses a wrapper class around its LocalStorage objects that exposes a
more convenient interface to the rest of the system. This is a LocalStorageWrapper called
Iswrapper.
Some basic information about how a download is progressing also needs to be stored
in the state of an AnonymousDownload, including what pieces have been downloaded and
how much data the download is going to contain when it finishes. The AnonymousDown-
load also needs the hashes of the pieces of the file to make sure they are correct.
6.4 BitTorrent client state
FlowerPot needs to maintain some state to act as a BitTorrent client in downloads. Much of
this state is identical to the state maintained in BitTorrent mentioned in Chapter 4, Section
4. Following is a description of the main data structures FlowerPot uses to implement a
BitTorrent client.
AnonymousSingleTorrent: Each AnonymousSingleTorrent represents one download in
which the node is acting as a proxy. Most of the objects that follow are part of its state.
There are several new pieces of state stored in FlowerPot but not BitTorrent. For example,
FlowerPot uses more threads than BitTorrent, because it needs all the threads BitTorrent
uses to interact with a swarm plus more to interact with FlowerPot clients on anonymous
routing paths. This necessitated adding some locks to the state of AnonymousSingleTor-
rents. AnonymousSingleTorrents are themselves stored in an object of class ProxyDLs,
whose purpose is to manage all the functionality of a FlowerPot proxy.
AnonymousMultitorrent: Each FlowerPot client has a single AnonymousMultiTorrent,
which contains a RawServer object whose purpose is to perform various tasks in another
thread. For example, when a BEGINDL message arrives, the proxy's process _from.anonymous downloadei
method calls the AnonymousMultiTorrent's startdownload method, which causes the
RawServer to start the download in another thread. Meanwhile process _fromanonymousidownloader
goes back to receiving for the next message from the downloader. The AnonymousMul-
titorrent also stores the RateLimiter, which makes sure BitTorrent does not upload too
quickly.
Connection: FlowerPot uses a Connection object to represent a connection to each
BitTorrent client with which it is communicating.
AnonymousSorageWrapper: Each AnonymousSingleTorrent has an AnonymousStor-
ageWrapper to send pieces to the downloader to be stored and to retrieve pieces from the
downloader. Each AnonymousStorageWrapper has a number of data structures that Bit-
Torrent uses to maintain things like information on which pieces have been downloaded so
far and which pieces have been requested from peers.
FlowerPot needs to check to see if its pieces are correct. BitTorrent downloads each
piece one small block at a time, and FlowerPot does not store the partially-completed pieces
to disk. An object called ProxyPieces is used by each AnonymousStorageWrapper to store
partially-finished pieces.
Whenever FlowerPot downloads a piece and determines that it is correct, it stores it in a
data structure called a PieceCache. The purpose of a PieceCache is to reduce the number of
times that FlowerPot needs to request data from the downloader over the network (which
is slow). The PieceCache can store whole pieces or parts of pieces, but stores parts of
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only fifty pieces at most. When a piece not in the PieceCache and is requested from the
downloader, the downloader sends more data than was requested. All the additional data
goes into the PieceCache, to allow the next several requests to be handled locally instead
of going back to the network again.
Whenever a proxy requests a piece over the network, it uses a hash map stored by
the AnonymousStorageWrapper called outstanding-requests. Each request is assigned a
unique nonce, and FlowerPot sets outstandingrequests[nonce] to True when the request
is sent to the downloader. FlowerPot then uses a lock, stored in a map called requestlocks
and keyed by the same nonce, to wait until the response to the request request has arrived.
When a RESPONSE message arrives, the answer is read from it and stored in a map called
requestanswers, keyed with the same nonce. FlowerPot also sets outstandingsrequests[nonce]
to False. The AnonymousStorageWrapper stops waiting after either a fixed time has passed
or the response has arrived. When that happens, if outstandingrequests[nonce] is still
True, it means the request was not answered successfully. Otherwise, it was, and the answer
is stored in the PieceCache and sent to the peer who made the request.
When a piece is downloaded from the BitTorrent swarm, some of the state of the Anony-
mousStorageWrapper needs to be updated. For example, the list of which nodes have been
downloaded and which have been requested from the swarm need to have that piece re-
moved. Similarly, when an OTHERGOT message is received, the same state needs to be
updated and any requests sent to BitTorrent peers for that piece need to be canceled. Flow-
erPot does this whenever it receives an OTHERGOT message.
SingleDownload: FlowerPot uses a SingleDownload object stored by the Downloader
to manage downloading from each peer it downloads from. Each one stores a Connection
object for that peer. It works the same in FlowerPot as in BitTorrent.
Downloader: The Downloader has many SingleDownload objects that it manages, and
works the same in FlowerPot as in BitTorrent.
Upload: FlowerPot maintains an Upload object for each AnonymousSingleTorrent. It
stores the Connections to each peer to which the client is uploading, adding pieces to the
buffer of requests to answer as they get requested. (The RateLimiter actually sends them.)
This object works identically to the version in BitTorrent. FlowerPot has one Uploader for
each AnonymousSingleTorrent.
RateLimiter: The RateLimiter stores information about how quickly the client has been
uploading to each peer and for how long. Its purpose is to send data at the rate allowed by
BitTorrent, and no faster. The FlowerPot version is identical to the BitTorrent version. The
one AnonymousMultiTorrent has one RateLimiter for all the downloads in which that node
is a proxy.
Choker: The Choker decides which peers in the BitTorrent swarm to choke, as in a
regular BitTorrent client [3]. FlowerPot does not modify it significantly. Each Anony-
mousSingleTorrent has one Choker.
PiecePicker: FlowerPot uses a PiecePicker to decide what piece to request next, as does
BitTorrent. In BitTorrent the internal state of the PiecePicker contains how many peers have
each piece, to implement rarest-first. The FlowerPot version differs slightly in that it stores
a set of which pieces other proxies have requested. Instead of doing a straight rarest-first
selection, FlowerPot uses that set to try to choose the rarest piece that no other proxy has
requested.
6.5 Proxy state
FlowerPot needs to maintain some data structures to integrate the code that handles Flow-
erPot paths with the code that handles the BitTorrent client. The BitTorrent data structures
store the sockets they need to send data on to get it to the downloader, but traffic from
the downloader somehow needs to be able to affect the BitTorrent objects. This is done
inside the ProxyDLs' process_from-anonymous downloader method, which receives
traffic from the incoming sockets and does whatever needs to be done as a result. For ex-
ample, when a RESPONSE arrives from the downloader, that method is where the call to
the AnonymousStorageWrapper's setLresponse method occurs to set the response to be
returned.
Some state needs to be maintained by a ProxyDLs object for
processfromanonymousdownloader. It needs the URL of the download whose proxy
it is running, the unique integer identifier assigned to that download (-1 initially, then some
non-negative integer after a GETINFO message is received), and the contents of the tor-
rent. When a proxy receives a BEGINDL message, that message contains the indices of
the pieces that the downloader had when it was sent. In response, the proxy creates the
BitTorrent client data structures and informs the BitTorrent swarm of what pieces it has
access to. After that point, if an OTHERGOT message is received, the BitTorrent swarm
can be informed with no difficulty. FlowerPot still needs to handle OTHERGOT messages
received before the BEGINDL, however. Therefore it maintains a set of pieces indicated by
OTHERGOT messages. When it informs BitTorrent peers of what pieces it has, it includes
the pieces in that set.

Chapter 7
Implementation details
The previous three chapters have given a basic overview of the design of FlowerPot. A
number of details were left out of that discussion, because a more high-level understanding
was necessary before addressing them. This chapter fills in the remaining details of peer
discovery, of path setup, of interaction with the BitTorrent swarm, of file storage, and of
dealing with greedy users who try to take resources from the network without ever doing
work for anyone else.
7.1 Peer discovery
A number of issues concerning peer discovery need to be more fully specified. These issues
include when to request new peers, when to add peers to the table of peer IP addresses,
when to expire peers that haven't been heard from in a while, and what interval to ask peers
to use between PEERXKEEPALIVE messages.
When a client signs on, it needs to request peers immediately. It does so by whichever
method the user selected: contacting a discovery server, contacting a random peer that the
client has seen on a prior session that resides in the peer cache, or contacting a specific
peer that the user chose. Additionally, every five seconds every AnonymousDownload runs
a method called keepalive.check that makes sure that sends KEEPALIVE messages to
proxies and checks whether those proxies are still alive. That method also makes sure that
at least 30 IP addresses are in the client's table of peers. If not, it chooses three peers and
a discovery server and requests 30 peers from them (7 from each peer, 9 from the server).
The virtue of requesting from multiple sources is that one source could easily be malicious
and collude with other malicious nodes, but it is less likely that three will all be malicious,
so it avoids a situation where a node only knows about malicious peers.
There are several times when FlowerPot adds a peer to its table of peer IP addresses,
called IPs. Whenever it receives a message from a peer, it adds that peer. Also, whenever
it receives a NODES message, unless one of a few exceptional situations occurs, it adds
all the IP addresses contained in that message to IPs. It will never add the IP address of
any known discovery server to IPs. It will never add an IP address that was last heard
from more than 150 seconds ago. Finally, if it already has 90 or more peers in its table, it
considers that to be enough and does not store any more from NODES messages.
To make sure its table of peers is up-to-date (i.e. doesn't contain peers that have
left the network), FlowerPot uses PEERKIEEPALIVE messages. Each client sends a
PEERKEEPALIVE message to each of its peers every 120 seconds by default. If a par-
ticular client has over 3000 peers (which is unlikely to happen to any node except the
discovery server), instead it tells its peers to send it PEERKEEPALIVE messages less of-
ten by adding setting a longer interval in its NODES and PEERKEEPALIVE messages.
That interval is such that the rate of PEERKEEPALIVE messages being received 25 per
second. Clients periodically check the last times they heard from each peer and expire any
peer they haven't heard from in 150 seconds. They perform this check once every 150
seconds.
The discovery servers do not send PEERXKEEPALIVE messages.
7.2 Path setup
Previous chapters have described how FlowerPot sets up paths to send anonymously be-
tween a downloader and a proxy, as well as how each node on the path behaves. The issues
of how to choose a specific next hop or proxy, when to establish a path, and when to kill a
path have not been addressed.
When establishing a path, a downloader first has to select the proxy. It does this by
choosing one of the peers it knows about. It never chooses a peer that is already acting
as a proxy in the same download, because the same peer will not participate in the same
BitTorrent swarm twice. If it has tried to use a particular peer as either a proxy or a next
hop in the last 30 seconds, it will not choose it again. That policy has several advantages.
It avoids repeatedly making requests of a peer that just signed off. It avoids inundating a
busy peer with requests. Finally, it prevents a situation where a path on a download for a
file fails, the downloader detects the error and tries to set up a new path to the same proxy,
and the proxy refuses to participate because it has not detected the failure yet and is already
in the BitTorrent swarm for that file. FlowerPot chooses a peer uniformly at random from
among the ones that satisfy those constraints.
When FlowerPot needs to choose a next hop, either for a path it is establishing as a
downloader or for one where it is an intermediate node, it has several similar constraints. It
does not choose any proxy that it has previously used as a proxy or next hop in the last 30
seconds. It never chooses itself or the proxy as its next hop. When initiating a path, it never
chooses any peer that is currently a first hop for the same download as its next hop. When
acting as an intermediate node, it never chooses its previous hop as its next hop. Finally, if
it has any peers who are not currently acting as a next hop for it, it is guaranteed to choose
one of those peers as its next hop.
FlowerPot examines all the peers that satisfy those constraints and divides them into
categories based upon how much work it has done on behalf of its peers, and vice versa.
Its goal is to avoid taking advantage of peers by asking them to do huge amounts of work.
Peers are divided into three categories: debtors, creditors, and others. A FlowerPot peer
x is considered to be doing work on behalf of a peer y whenever y sends traffic to x or x
sends traffic to y on a path that was established through x in response to a SETUP message
from y. FlowerPot tracks the difference between how much work it has done for each
of its peers and how much work its peers have each done for it. This difference is said
to be its debt and is stored in the hash map my_debts. FlowerPot contains a constant
called DEBTTHRESHOLD (equal to 80000000 bytes) and one called DEBTIFRAC
(equal to 0.5). A client considers a peer its debtor if the peer owes it a debt of at least
DEBT_FRAC * DEBTTHRESHOLD bytes. If it owes a debt at least that large to
the peer, it considers the peer its creditor. All other nodes are neither debtors nor creditors.
Once the peers are divided into categories, FlowerPot selects one to be its next hop. If
it has any peers who are not its creditors, it is guaranteed to choose one of them, to avoid
taking advantage of a particular peer. In that case, each debtor is chosen with twice as
high a probability as each peer that is neither a debtor nor a creditor. If the client has only
creditors, one of them is chosen uniformly at random.
FlowerPot creates new paths to proxies under various circumstances. At the start of a
download, it attempts to make paths to its proxies. If a path failure is detected on a path
for which a SETUPACK has been received, the downloader immediately tries to create a
replacement path. If a SETUP message is sent and ten seconds elapse with no SETUPACK
being received, the downloader tries to replace the path. Finally, the downloader runs a
method called keepalive_check every five seconds. One of its effects is that if the number
of paths that have been established plus the number that are establishing (e.g. the total
number of members of the sets called sockets and unacked) is too low, it tries to establish a
new path.
A downloader will kill a path under several circumstances. If the user clicks the "Stop
download" button; ten seconds have elapsed with no messages being received; two min-
utes have elapsed with no finished pieces being received; a CANCEL, NOMETAINFO,
TOOBUSY, or DLCAP message is received; an incorrect piece is received; the number of
PIECEWRONG messages is more than one-tenth the number of correct pieces received; or
an exception happens on any operation; it is a sign that either the state associated with that
path has been corrupted or a node on the path is maliciously altering packets or being slow.
Under all of these circumstances, the path is killed.
To kill a path after the SETUPACK is received, a downloader adds that path's key to
killedkeys using the method named kill. That causes the loop that continues waiting to
receive messages in process_incoming.msgs to terminate. After the loop, the method
calls a method called bury, which deletes the state associated with that path. To kill a
path before the SETUPACK is received, a downloader calls kill, adding that path's key to
killed_keys. Eventually, when the SETUPACK arrives or ten seconds elapse, bury will be
called to eliminate the path's state.
Clients that are acting as intermediate peers on a path will kill that path when a socket
times out. Intermediate peers run one method to forward traffic from the downloader to the
proxy and another method for the reverse direction. Each method sets a variable to True
when it detects a failure so that the method for the other direction can detect the failure and
terminate more quickly.
A proxy decides to kill a download under several circumstances, too. When a socket
times out, when a download has been going for over ten minutes, when the torrent is not
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downloaded successfully, when the BitTorrent client fails to start up and initialize its data
structures, when a CANCEL message is received, when downloading another piece will
cause the proxy to have downloaded 10% of the file, or when an exception happens, the
proxy calls its kill method using the unique integer assigned to that download as the ar-
gument. This adds that ID to a list of IDs that have been killed and causes the loop in
process_from_anonymous.downloader to break. It then deallocates the state associated
with that download and terminates the thread.
7.3 Interaction with BitTorrent
There are a few details of how FlowerPot interacts with BitTorrent that remain to be ad-
dressed. There are several data structures that need to both interact with BitTorrent and
send data back to the real downloader. This could be a problem if, say, more than one of
these objects were trying to send at the same time. This problem is solved with a lock that
threads need to acquire before sending to the downloader.
7.4 File storage
FlowerPot proxies sometimes have to request pieces from the downloader to respond to
requests from peers. This takes a long time, because the pieces must be sent over the
network. FlowerPot does two things to reduce the time spent making requests and waiting
for the results. It caches up to fifty pieces at each proxy, and it responds with more than
just the part of the piece that is currently being requested.
Usually, a BitTorrent peer will request a 262144-byte piece in 16 blocks of 16384 bytes
each. Responding to each request by going over the network would thus require going over
the network 16 times for a single piece of the file. FlowerPot reduces this to just one time
by sending the part of the piece that is requested, plus up to 15 more.
FlowerPot also caches all the pieces it downloads or obtains from the proxy in an object
called a PieceCache that each AnonymousStorageWrapper has. Up to fifty pieces can
reside in the cache at one and FlowerPot uses a least-recently-used policy for eviction.
When it responds to a piece request from a BitTorrent peer, it checks if the piece resides
in the cache before sending a request to the downloader. The PieceCache can hold whole
pieces, or, if only part of the piece is available, it can store partial pieces. This might happen
if, say, a particular file uses a piece size larger than 262144-bytes, so that the 16 pieces of
16384 bytes are not enough to hold the whole piece.
7.5 Punishing greedy nodes
FlowerPot has a number of operations it performs to detect and punish greedy users who
try to take resources from the network and give none back.
A client can only participate in a limited number of routing paths, because otherwise it
would get heavily loaded. It cannot initiate more than one downloads at a time. It cannot
act as a proxy on more than 6 downloads at a time. Finally, it cannot exist as a proxy or
intermediate node on more than 20 total paths at a time. Clients prioritize doing work for
peers that have done work for them in the past, and when they are busy, they refuse to do
work for peers they have done large amounts of work for already.
A FlowerPot client is not supposed to try to set up a path to a peer if it owes a debt of
DEBTTHRESHOLD bytes (DEBT_THRESHOLD is equal to 80000000) to that
peer. If a client gets a SETUP message from a peer that should not be sending it, it refuses
to set up the path. Furthermore, if setting up the path would cause it to violate the limits on
the number of paths and downloads it can participate in, it might refuse to set up the path,
depending on which nodes owe it how much of a debt.
When a SETUP message is received but setting up a new path would violate the limits
of how many paths and downloads a proxy can participate in, it examines the debts of
the peer requesting the path and its previous hops on all other paths. If the one making the
request owes it a debt of DEBT_THRESHOLD, it refuses to set up the path. Otherwise,
it checks if one of its previous hops owes it that much of a debt. If not, it refuses to establish
the path. Otherwise, it establishes the path and breaks a path where its previous hop is a
debtor. This scheme is similar to the scheme proposed by Hales and Patarin to prevent
cheating in BitTorrent [5].
Under some conditions, a client decides that a peer has behaved so badly that it should
be blacklisted. Clients will not respond to peers on their blacklists.
When my _debts[peerip] gets updated, the client checks whether the indicated peer sat-
isfies three conditions. If all are satisfied, the peer gets added to the blacklist. The first con-
dition is whether the debt owed by the peer is at least a constant called BLACKMARK _THRESHOLD
(160000000 bytes). The second is whether the client has tried to establish paths to that peer
at least three times (because the peer may not be maliciously rejecting path setup if the
client just hasn't tried to use it very many times). The third condition is that the peer tried
to set up at least three paths to the client after its debt exceeded DEBT_THRESHOLD
(which should not happen).
There are two ways to get removed from a peer's blacklist. Entries in the blacklist
file that are a year old get deleted, to avoid punishing a peer forever if it was bad once.
Every member in a blacklist gets put on probation every session with probability 0.1, to
give it another chance. Instead of just having a two-state blacklist (where peers are in or
out), FlowerPot stores a number of black marks for each peer, and adds one every time the
peer misbehaves. If the peer on probation misbehaves again, it gets another black mark.
If it behaves well and allows a client whose blacklist it is on to accrue a debt of at least
DEBTFRAC * DEBT_THRESHOLD to it, a black mark gets removed. If the last
black mark is removed, the peer gets removed from the blacklist.
It is still possible to cheat and gain increased performance at the expense of peers.
One could just go up to the limits allowed by this protocol and cheat until it is about to
get punished by every peer. Hales and Patarin argue that because BitTorrent users in a
single swarm share some common interest, they behave cordially and altruistically, so that
although it is possible to cheat in BitTorrent, few users do it [5]. This is true on FlowerPot,
as well, where all users have a common interest in anonymity.

Chapter 8
Security
FlowerPot faces many potential security threats. Some adversaries may try to take down
the network, hurt performance, or compromise anonymity. Some attacks may be done from
outside the network, others by modified versions of the source code. FlowerPot defends
against some of these. Some are difficult to execute for most real adversaries. Others are a
real threat.
8.1 Defended attacks
FlowerPot defends against a number of attacks. Denial-of-service attacks, trying to get
peers to download the wrong pieces, and filtering certain kinds of content.
Denial-of-service attacks against a distributed peer-to-peer system are difficult, because
there is no single point of failure to attack. Although someone could shut down a single
client or BitTorrent tracker, that would only prevent one person from downloading or one
file from being downloaded. The closest thing to a single point of failure to attack is the
discovery server, but there can be several of those acting independently, any user can use
any one of them, and even if all the discovery servers are down, clients can still get access
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to peers by contacting someone from their peer caches. Denial-of-service attacks will not
be effective against FlowerPot.
An adversary could try to stop certain kinds of content from being downloaded by
dropping all downloads of certain kinds of files he dislikes. For example, a repressive
government adversary could filter out all downloads that mention its human rights abuses.
That attack doesn't work because the adversary cannot guarantee that it will be chosen to
appear on all the paths for a particular download.
FlowerPot also protects against members of the network publishing incorrect pieces.
Each downloader receives the piece hashes from each proxy. If an incorrect piece is re-
ceived, the downloader detects the problem, and kills the path (which must have contained
a misbehaving node, because correct proxies never send back incorrect pieces).
An adversary would thus need to fool FlowerPot into thinking that some other hashes
were the correct ones in order to make it download the file incorrectly. Every proxy sends
back the hashes from the torrent file, so FlowerPot can detect if multiple paths have claimed
different hashes. It assumes that the plurality of proxies will send it the correct hashes. In
order to corrupt the hash IDs a client receives, an adversary needs to have a node on at least
half of the paths a client sets up. This attack is probably too expensive to mount.
8.2 Undefended attacks
FlowerPot does not defend against a number of attacks, mainly because these attacks are
very difficult to stop. Adversaries with extreme capabilities or large sums of money can
compromise the anonymity of many users or hurt overall system performance.
If an adversary is capable of watching all of a particular user's links, then that adver-
sary can see what downloads the user initiates. He can then determine what files the user
downloaded by storing all of the user's traffic and examining it. The user cannot plausibly
claim to have been an intermediate node, because the adversary would have seen an incom-
ing packet if that were the case. This attack is simply difficult to defend against, and even
plagues other systems with stronger anonymity [4]. Fortunately, most likely adversaries
lack this capability. Even for the ones that have it, such as ISPs, analyzing all the traffic
sent by a large number of users is technically difficult.
An adversary could passively log all traffic seen by a number of colluding nodes to
compromise anonymity. If the adversary controls the second hop on some path, it may be
able to determine that the second hop is in fact second by watching the round-trip times
from when a REQUEST is sent to when a RESPONSE is received. While the second hop
probably won't see the whole file, the proxies will see what torrent is being downloaded. If
the proxy is under control of the adversary, too, the adversary knows what torrent was used
to download, and by whom. This is an example of one of many logging and timing attacks
that can compromise anonymity. Other anonymity systems are vulnerable to similar timing
attacks [4]. Fortunately, it is probably difficult for an adversary to control a large enough
fraction of the network to mount this attack successfully against any particular user, and
only if the second hop has an extremely low latency to the downloader will it be clear who
the first hop is.
An adversary could also have a large number of nodes join the network and participate
in useless downloads to reduce the performance of the network. This attack, once again,
is hard to defend against if the adversary has the resources to mount it. But it essentially
amounts to a massive denial-of-service attack on a whole peer-to-peer network, and it is
unlikely that the adversary will have sufficient funds to mount this attack.

Chapter 9
Performance Analysis
The performance of FlowerPot was analyzed by performing several experiments using
PlanetLab [1]. Some of these experiments just measured the speed of downloading un-
der various conditions, while others were meant to see how changing some parameters
(average path length or number of proxies per download) affected the download speed. As
a point of comparison, a number of PlanetLab machines used an ordinary BitTorrent client
(BitTorrent 4.2.2) to download to see how much slower FlowerPot is. Some decrease in
performance is an acceptable cost to pay for anonymity, but to be useful FlowerPot has to
be fast enough that users will be willing to wait long enough for it to download.
Most of the experiments downloaded a video file that was roughly an hour long and
between 400 and 450 megabytes. Specifically, they were episodes of "Democracy Now!"
That show is filmed every weekday and distributed via BitTorrent on a particular tracker.
The exact file being downloaded varied from experiment to experiment, but the character-
istics of the overall BitTorrent swarm remained roughly the same. Typically an ordinary
BitTorrent client downloading one of those files they day it came out would find between
20 and 35 peers, and the tracker was the same for all the files. The reason the specific file
varied is that it took several days to perform the experiments, and the swarm is considerably
smaller the second and third days after an episode has been posted.
9.1 Baseline Measurements
As a point of comparison, five randomly-selected PlanetLab nodes from a particular slice
were used to download a "Democracy Now!" episode using BitTorrent. The download
speed of BitTorrent was measured by downloading the file for 300 seconds and seeing how
many bytes were received. The average download speed was 418257 bytes per second,
and the speeds had a standard deviation of 1147409 bytes per second (some machines are
heavily loaded or of very poor quality, while others are much better, so the variance is
high). This is faster than some but not all of the FlowerPot experiments in the next two
sections, but not by such a huge margin that FlowerPot is not usable.
One of the experiments to follow uses all the nodes in a particular PlanetLab slice to
download an unpopular file. That file was a video with two seeders and no other peers.
The download speed of BitTorrent was measured for that file in the same fashion as for the
more popular file. The average speed was 29199 bytes per second, and the speeds had a
standard deviation of 40054 bytes per second. Again, FlowerPot is close to this speed for
the unpopular file.
Some of the experiments in the next two sections do not use the entire slice uniformly,
but rather use only five particular nodes. Among those five nodes, the average download
speed using a standard BitTorrent client was 247178 bytes per second with a standard
deviation of 411876 bytes per second.
9.2 Download Speeds
First the speed at which FlowerPot downloads under optimistic conditions was measured.
At least 50 peers on PlanetLab were signed onto the network. (The exact number varied as
some PlanetLab nodes were down some of the time during the experiments.) None of these
peers did downloads of their own. A machine on a local ethernet was used to download a
file, using those peers as proxies. The downloads all proceeded for 300 seconds, at which
time the download rate was measured.
There were three proxies working in parallel for each download. The average path
length was varied by changing the probability of an intermediate hop forwarding a SETUP
message to another intermediate hop instead of to the proxy. The experiment was repeated
for two files, one a popular file (the "Democracy Now!" episode), and one an unpopular
file (a video file whose BitTorrent swarm contained two seeders and no other downloaders).
Each data point is based on the results of five trials.
The results for the popular and unpopular files are shown in Figure 9-1 and Figure 9-2,
respectively. The popular file downloaded considerably more quickly, which is typically
the case with BitTorrent [3].
Surprisingly, the observed speeds peaked in the middle for the popular file rather than
being highest with the shortest path length and decreasing monotonically. The reason for
these counterintuitive results is that the path length is not related to the main limiting factor
in these cases. With only one download going, the nodes on the network are not using
much CPU or many network resources on FlowerPot, so the limiting factor that determines
how quickly the download can occur is how quickly the peers in the BitTorrent swarm
are willing to send data. For the popular file, with a large set of peers, randomly being
unchoked by good peers early can dramatically speed up a download, while taking a long
time to find those good peers may make it slower. Whether this happens is not well-
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Figure 9-1: Performance of FlowerPot with a popular file. Several dozen PlanetLab nodes
were signed on as FlowerPot peers. One peer downloaded a popular file, and its download speed
was measured. The experiment was repeated for several path lengths (the more likely a peer is to
forward to another intermediate hop instead of the destination, the longer the path length). The
horizontal line is the average download speed for that file with an ordinary BitTorrent client on a
PlanetLab node. FlowerPot's speed was competitive with BitTorrent's.
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Figure 9-2: Performance of FlowerPot with a popular file. Several dozen PlanetLab nodes were
signed on as FlowerPot peers. One peer downloaded an unpopular file, and its download speed was
measured. The experiment was repeated for several path lengths. The horizontal line is the average
download speed for that file with an ordinary BitTorrent client on a PlanetLab node. FlowerPot's
speed was competitive with BitTorrent's.
correlated with path length. Similarly, the speed for the unpopular file increases going from
forwarding to another peer with probability .1 to probability .3. This is because, at those
probabilities, the limiting factor is the seeders' sending rates. At higher probabilities, as the
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CPU and network usage of the PlanetLab nodes increases and becomes a limiting factor,
performance drops. The speeds still have a high variance, probably due to differences in the
quality of the PlanetLab nodes chosen to be on paths. This caused the average download
with a probability of .9 to be slightly faster than the average with probability .7 for the
unpopular file.
The popular file had the same tracker and a similar swarm to the one downloaded using
BitTorrent in the previous section. In the experiments for a probability of forwarding to
another intermediate hop equal to 0.3 or 0.5, FlowerPot slightly outperformed BitTorrent.
For a probability of .7, FlowerPot's speed was better than 89% as fast as BitTorrent's.
Although it may be possible to convince some users to leave their machines on running
FlowerPot when they aren't downloading, most of the time one would expect most people
on the network to be downloading some file. Thus the above experiment, where only one
peer was downloading, is not the most realistic test of FlowerPot. A more realistic test
began with choosing five PlanetLab nodes distributed at different sites around the United
States and having each one sign on and begin downloading a different file. Then a machine
on a local ethernet signed on to download a sixth file, and the download speed of that
machine was measured after 300 seconds.
In this experiment, each peer did a download of its own. Therefore one would expect
worse performance than in the previous experiment, because there is more traffic being
sent over the network and more work being done by the CPU of each machine. Because
each peer is downloading, adding more proxies will not necessarily increase the download
speed: it may just increase CPU loading and lead to even more timeouts. In fact, lower
speeds were observed here than in the previous, more optimistic experiment, and at most
settings FlowerPot downloaded faster with two proxies than with three.
Again the probability of an intermediate hop forwarding a SETUP message to another
intermediate hop as opposed to the proxy was varied, but this time the number of proxies
per download was varied, as well. As before, each data point is based on the average and
standard deviation of five trials. When FlowerPot has fewer than 30 entries in its table of
peer IP addresses, it spends a lot of its resources trying to acquire more. This resulted in a
significant performance decrease, so that functionality was turned off for this experiment.
On a real network, FlowerPot would have no trouble maintaining 30 peers.
Figure 9-3 shows the results. The curve for three proxies has the fastest download
when the probability of forwarding to another intermediate hop is 0.1, but as the probability
increases, the curve for two proxies becomes the fastest. In this case, the extra downloads
generated more work for the machines, and their CPUs were heavily loaded. This led to an
increase in the time it took data to get from the downloader to the proxies, which reduced
the upload speed of the proxies, which in turn reduced the speed at which the BitTorrent
swarm was willing to upload to the proxies. An increase in CPU load also increased the
number of timeouts, which meant FlowerPot had to spend more of its time establishing
new paths and waiting for them to start to get data. At low probabilities of forwarding,
the path length was low, so the CPU loading was not as severe. At higher probabilities,
it became a larger problem, and was more severe in the case with three proxies than with
two because each download required 50% more work when there were three proxies per
download. This caused the curve with two proxies to outperform the curve with three
proxies for probabilities of .3, .5, and .7.
The curve with one proxy is at the bottom because having more proxies means more
aggressively trying to download from peers in the BitTorrent swarm.
At extremely high probabilities (e.g. .9), all three curves have almost the same down-
load speed, probably because all the CPUs are so heavily loaded and so little being down-
loaded that no real difference between the cases is observable. The variance in speeds is
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Figure 9-3: Performance of FlowerPot with many downloads. Five PlanetLab nodes were
signed on as FlowerPot peers, each doing its own download. One additional peer began a download
and its download speed was measured. This experiment was repeated for several numbers of proxies
per download and several path lengths (the more likely a peer is to forward to another intermediate
hop instead of the destination, the longer the path). The CPUs of the machines were heavily loaded
from doing the work on all those downloads, so performance suffered as path length increased. For
the same reason, using two proxies per download was faster than using three even though more
proxies can request data from the BitTorrent swarm more aggressively, because the additional path
per download made CPU loading worse.
many times the average speed.
Using the same five nodes as this experiment, BitTorrent's average download speed
was 247178. With probabilities of forwarding to another intermediate hop of .1 and .3,
FlowerPot using two or three proxies is competitive with this. For all other setting for
this experiment, FlowerPot was significantly outperformed by BitTorrent. With two prox-
ies, however, even if the probability is as high as .7, FlowerPot was over 70% as fast as
BitTorrent. That speed is probably acceptable to users if it means they can be anonymous.
9.3 Resilience to Churn
To measure FlowerPot's resilience to chum, between 50 and 60 PlanetLab nodes were
chosen. Initially, 40 of them were signed onto the network. Every second, there was some
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Figure 9-4: Performance of FlowerPot with churn. Forty PlanetLab nodes were signed on, then
one node was signed on to download a file. Each second, a node either entered or left the network
with some probability to introduce churn. Only one arrival or departure per second occurred, and
both occurred with equal probability. As churn increased, performance generally went down, but it
went down slowly enough that FlowerPot will be useful even in the presence of realistic chum.
probability of a node entering or leaving the FlowerPot network. In any given second,
at most one change in the set of nodes signed on could occur, and it would be either a
departure or an arrival with equal probability. After this process started, a machine on a
local ethernet began a download, which lasted for 300 seconds before the average rate was
measured. The experiment was repeated for several different rates of chum, and for both
one proxy per download and three proxies per download. Each combination of settings was
used with five trials, and the average and standard deviation were measured for each.
Figure 9-4 shows the results of these experiments. It shows a general downward trend,
where as the chum increases, the performance decreases. This is because paths break more
often and need to be re-established, which may take multiple tries when there is chum.
If a typical user stayed on a network for five minutes (a relatively low time for a peer-
to-peer network [14]) and arrivals and departures were Poisson, it would correspond to
a probability of an arrival or departure in any second that was between 0.2 and 0.3. If
most users did longer downloads or altruistically stayed on the network to help others,
-------------------------------------------
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the network could realize a better chum rate than that in actual deployment. Even at that
churn rate, however, FlowerPot still achieves a throughput in the hundreds of kilobytes per
second, which means it should be fast enough to be useful to users, even in the presence of
realistic chum.

Chapter 10
Conclusion
FlowerPot has been described, including a specification for the operations it performs and
the messages it sends, as well as the details of its state and its implementation. It interacts
with BitTorrent clients and allows users to download any file that can be downloaded via
BitTorrent. This represents an improvement over most prior anonymity systems in that
FlowerPot provides access to more content.
FlowerPot does not suffer from the performance difficulties of many prior systems,
achieving download speeds close to BitTorrent, even using heavily-loaded PlanetLab nodes.
Even in the face of realistic amounts of chum, FlowerPot continues to perform at acceptable
speeds.
FlowerPot also achieves good security, making it difficult for any adversary that cannot
watch all of a user's links to determine whether a user was responsible for downloading
a particular file. With multiple methods of connecting to the network and acquiring the
IP addresses of peers, even without using the central server, FlowerPot can also defend
against denial-of-service. This makes FlowerPot a useful, relatively safe, high-performance
anonymous file-sharing system.
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